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ASSESSING CHINA'S 1994 FISCAL REFORMS: 
AN INTERMEDIATE REPORT 
Mengzhong Zhang* 
ABSTRACT. To boost the fiscal revenue, i.e., government revenue over GOP 
and central government revenue over government total revenue, China 
conducted the 1994 fiscal reforms. According to some observers, the results 
of the initial reforms were mixed. This study reveals, contrary to most 
examinations of previous studies, the 1994 fiscal reforms have been an 
enormous success in achieving the original policy purposes, although 
remaining problems still present a daunting task for the Chinese government. 
This paper examines the factors triggering the 1994 fiscal reforms, reveals 
the contents and accomplishments of the reforms, explores unfinished tasks 
and ultimately proposes some policy implications. 
INTRODUCTION 
By any standards, China's 1994 fiscal reform is not a whimsical 
action triggered by impractical theory or policy considerations. Rather, 
the reform was derived from a converging force that came from a 
number of directions. Looking at the issue from a general 
perspective, the reform was an adjustment of the relationships 
between central and local governments, between government and 
enterprises, and between the state and citizens. This effort was an 
ongoing process along the line of the grand policy "Reform and 
Opening to the Outside" stipulated in the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. The primary purpose 
of the 1994 fiscal reform was to increase the ratio of government 
revenue over GOP and the ratio of central government revenue over 
total government revenue. In short, the 1994 fiscal reform targeted at 
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strengthening the capacity of central government in its macro 
economic management and coordination. 
The initial responses of China's 1994 fiscal reforms were indeed 
mixed, at best. Most Chinese scholars and practitioners alike kept a 
cautiously optimistic stance about the fiscal reform design, arguing it 
was a rational approach targeted at solving a number of policy 
concerns. Looking at the outcomes of the reforms, however, these 
scholars and practitioners might feel dismayed since the reforms 
failed to bring about the expected results. Some local Chinese 
officials complained that the reforms were a selfish action or a trick 
played by the central government, putting the local government at an 
even more difficult fiscal plight.3 Western scholars in Chinese studies 
presented a balanced view of the reforms on the surface, but a sense 
of suspicion exists regarding whether the reform could generate the 
anticipated outcome (Wang, 1997; Herschler, 1995). Nevertheless, 
most of these studies were completed within the first few years of the 
reform effort. After entering the new millennium, the scholarly 
attention paid to China's 1994 fiscal reforms gradually diminished. 
Given the significant impact of 1994 reforms to the current fiscal 
system in China, and its vital historical link between the past and the 
future, the author believes that assessing the reform in an 
intermediate phase is warranted. This study revisits the issue of 
China's 1994 fiscal reform. The next section examines the factors 
triggering the 1994 fiscal reforms; Section Ill reveals the contents of 
the reforms; Section IV shows the accomplishment of the 1994 fiscal 
reform; and Section V explores the unfinished tasks and the last 
section proposes some policy recommendations. By and large, the 
author expects to have different findings compared with previous 
studies, and these findings should have important policy implications. 
FACTORS TRIGGERING THE 1994 FISCAL REFORMS 
While many factors co-existed in driving the 1994 fiscal reforms, 
the primary reason was the decreasing central fiscal capacity 
demonstrated in two ratios from 1985 to 1992: (1) total government 
revenue over GOP (TR/GOP); and (2) central government revenue over 
total government revenue (CR/TR) (see Figure 1). 
If we use the comparable prices of GOP from Table 1, which 
deducted the influence of inflation, we can calculate the average 
annual GOP growth rate In the fifteen-year period between 1978 and 
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FIGURE 1 
"1\Yo ratios" between 1978 and 2001 
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1993 to be 9.66%. Likewise, we can also calculate the average 
annual growth rate of government revenue in the fifteen-year period 
from 1978 to 1993 to be 3.20%. In this fifteen-year period, while real 
GOP increased 3.99 times, the real government revenue increased 
only 1.60 times (both numbers accounted for inflation). These 
numbers are revealing. They inform us that while the GOP growth in 
this period is astonishing, comparable to the growth records of the 
East Asian economies, the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government 
was behind the full potential of the GOP increase. 
The unfortunate result of the decline of the government's 
extractive capacity is also vividly demonstrated in Table 1, which 
exhibits government revenue as a percentage of GOP, as well as the 
ratios of central and local government revenue to total revenue. From 
Table 1, we see a straight linear declining trend of government 
revenue as a percentage of GOP (%), the share of government 
revenue from close to one third (31.2%) in 1978 all the way down to 
about one eighth (12.6%) in 1993. Another disquieting trend is the 
share of central government revenue over the total government 
revenue, which declines from 40.5% in 1984 to 22.0% in 1993. 
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TABLE1 
Government Revenue as a Percentage of GOP, and the Ratios of 
Central and Local Government Revenue to Total Revenue: 
1978-2002 
Government Revenues 
GOP Central Government Local Government 
At At As% %of %of 
Current Current of Yuans Total Yuans Total 
Year Prices Prices GOP (Billions) Revenue (billions) Revenue 
1978 362.41 113.23 31.2 15.5 
1979 403.82 114.64 28.4 20.2 
1980 451.78 115.99 25.7 24.5 
1981 486.24 117.58 24.2 26.5 
1982 529.47 121.23 22.9 28.6 
1983 593.45 136.70 23.0 35.8 
1984 717.10 164.29 22.9 40.5 
1985 896.44 200.48 22.4 38.4 
1986 1020.22 212.20 20.8 36.7 
1987 1196.25 219.94 18.4 33.5 
1988 1492.83 235.72 15.8 32.9 
1989 1690.92 266.49 15.8 30.9 
1990 1854.79 293.71 15.8 33.8 
1991 2161.78 314.95 14.6 29.8 
1992 2663.81 348.34 13.1 28.1 
1993 3463.44 434.90 12.6 95.75 22.0 339.14 
1994 4675.94 5218.10 11.2 290.65 55.7 231.16 
1995 5847.81 624.22 10.7 325.66 52.2 298.56 
1996 6788.46 740.80 10.9 366.11 49.4 374.69 
1997 7446.26 8651.14 11.6 422.69 48.9 442.42 
1998 7834.52 987.60 12.6 489.20 49.5 498.40 
1999 8206.75 1144.41 13.9 584.92 51.1 559.49 
2000 8940.36 1339.52 15.0 698.92 52.2 640.61 
2001 9593.33 1638.60 17.1 858.27 59.6 780.33 
2002* 10239.8 1891.4 18.5 1102.0 58.3 789.4 
2003* 11669.4 2169.1 18.6 1246.5 57.5 922.6 
* 
Notes: * Xiang, 2003; ** Jin, 2004. 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical 
Yearbook 2001. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2001 and 2002. 
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These figures not only reveal a shrinking share of total 
government revenue as a percentage of GOP, but also indicate a 
declining percentage of central government revenue over total 
revenue. The decline of these two ratios is by no means trivial. 
Compared to other nations, the ratio of China's government revenue 
over GOP is fairly low. In the United States, tax revenue absorbs over 
30 percent of GOP, while the government share of GOP in most 
developed countries is even higher [e.g., shares in 1992: USA: 32.2; 
Japan: 34.4; UK: 38.8; Canada: 43.1; Western Germany: 45.3; France: 
46.1; Sweden: 60.0. Source: OECD, Statistics for Member Countries 
(June-July 1994)]. The average ratios between central and local 
revenue receipts in the 1980s were-US is 2.5:1, India 2.8:1, England 
5:1, and in China the ratio was 0.43:1 (Herschler, 1995). 
To be sure, there is a sound rationale for government to be 
involved in the activities of economic development and to take a fair 
share of GOP. In modern society, government is accountable for a 
number of functions. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989), 
modern governments' major functions include allocation, distribution 
and stabilization. To realize these functions for the benefit of the 
whole society, fiscal instruments are inevitably crucial. The low share 
of Chinese government revenue not only worries Chinese policy 
makers, but also has become a big concern of scholars throughout 
the globe (Lin, 2000). Bahl and Wallich (1992) concluded that public 
service levels are not adequate in all parts of China and the 
infrastructure gap might become a key problem in the future. Stiglitz 
(1998) believed that the Chinese government revenue share over 
GOP is too small compared with other nations and is a big barrier in 
China's accomplishment in its blueprint of economic development. 
Wang (1997) regarded the massive decline of the government's 
extractive capacity as an enfeeblement of China's ability to exercise 
macro control to an alarming extent. With the declining share of 
government revenue over GOP, especially the declining ratio of central 
government revenue over total revenue, many Chinese scholars 
worried about the growing regional disparity as well as the general low 
level of public service providing capacity (XIn, 1998; Xu, 1998; Yang & 
Wei, 1996). 
Then, what are the underlying contributors to the decline in 
government budgetary revenue in China? Lin (2000) identified three 
primary reasons (lowered corporate tax rates, small tax base, and tax 
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evasions) that lead to the shrinking share of government revenue over 
GOP. Wang {1997) argued it was imperative to plug in the five major 
loopholes {tax evasion, tax reductions and exemptions, tax arrears, 
extra-budgetary funds and extra-extra-budgetary funds) in order to 
arrest the two ratios from further decline. While their arguments are 
meaningful and are accountable for at least part of the underlying 
causes, the fundamental problem should be examined at a deeper 
level. My argument is along the line of reform designers, who regard 
the institutional arrangement of China's previous fiscal system as the 
root of flaw that resulted in the decline of the two ratios. With this in 
mind, we now briefly examine the fiscal relationship between the 
center and locality before the 1994 reform. 
As we know, China's economy was a centrally controlled planed 
system in the Mao era {1949-1976). At that time governments at 
various levels not only owned the corresponding enterprises, but also 
. were involved in enterprise management from plan, production, 
purchase and sale, as well as In fixing prices of materials and final 
products. The relationship between central and local governments is 
much like a pendulum swinging between trends in centralization and 
decentralization, reflecting the domestic management needs of 
political control at the top versus regional economic development at 
the bottom locality {Straussman & Zhang, 2001). The fiscal division of 
power fluctuated along the different periods of PRC's history and 
became an enduring topic of research and real politics. The 
centralized fiscal system featured in Mao's era was inconsistent with 
the market-oriented reforms beginning in 1978. At least three factors 
caused the changes in China's fiscal system. The first Is the rapid 
growth of non-state-owned enterprises: township and village 
enterprises, joint ventures, and private businesses. Second, 
accompanied by the growth of local political power, it is natural for 
local governments to require a commensurate decision-making power 
in the fiscal aspect. Third, only a decentralized fiscal system could 
stimulate local government in collecting revenue and promoting 
economic growth {Lin & Liu, 2000). The overall economic reform 
embarked on in the late 1970s was oriented toward the benefit of 
lower sub-national governments by means of "playing to the 
provinces" {Shirk, 1993). In the process, the center has lost, at least 
partially, its capacity to control the government below it {Wang, 1994). 
The central-local balance of power has undergone an unprecedented 
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and irreversible tilt toward the province, and even to the levels 
beneath the provinces (Zhang, 2002). 
At least four types/phases of fiscal arrangement can be 
distinguished from 1979 to 1993 (Lin, 2000). They are: Allow State 
Enterprises to Keep Some Profits (fang quan rang li); Substitute Taxes 
for Profit (li gai shui); the Contract Responsibility System (bao gan zhi) 
and the Tax Plus Profit system (li shui fen liu). A consequence of 
these fiscal reform efforts was the decline of "two ratios." How did 
this happen? An open secret is the conspiracy between local 
governments and enterprises at the expense of the central coffer. 
Before 1994, revenue and/or tax were collected by the local 
governments first and then submitted to the central government. 
Afterwards, the central government returned a share (according to a 
formula agreed upon by both sides) to the local governments. Most 
local governments frequently failed to realize its full potential in 
collecting all the possible money and then submitting the revenue to 
the center. Rather, they play games with the central government. The 
local governments would rather collect much less money from 
enterprises in each jurisdiction and ask these enterprises to 
contribute (in various format) part of the money to the local 
governments' extra-budgetary accounts or let these enterprises 
"voluntarily" provide local public services, which are the responsibility 
of the local governments, such as paving roads or building bridges or 
tunnels. Local governments often offer incentives to allure new 
enterprises in each territory by granting tax exemptions and 
deductions. These maneuvers and tricks have benefited both the 
local governments and the enterprises, but have caused a heavy loss 
for the central treasury. 
The above theory of conspiracy between local governments and 
enterprises had found a widespread market before the 1994 fiscal 
reforms. Although the practice was pervasive, empirical evidence was 
hard to collect. Fortunately, the 1994 fiscal reforms provided a golden 
opportunity to test the "Conspiracy Theory." A case in point was the 
revenue base. To ensure that every province would agree to and 
implement the 1994 fiscal reform policies, the interests of provinces 
could not be jeopardized. At least the previous provincial fiscal 
revenue level should be guaranteed. Initially, 1992 had been selected 
as the base year by the standing Committee of the Politburo. However, 
due to high pressure from coastal provinces, especially Guangdong, 
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the center decided to use 1993 instead as the base year. When local 
governments realized this in late September of 1993, there was a 
collection fever over the country. For the remaining three months in 
1993, local fiscal performance rocketed. "Some local governments 
collected arrears of taxes, some urged local banks to make loans to 
enterprises so that they would be able to pay such arrears, and some 
even collected 1994 taxes in advance" (Wang, 1997: 811}. 1993 
local tax collection was 28.3% higher than the budgeted number and 
39.9% higher than 1992 (Wang, 1997}. This story suggests that local 
governments do have the capacity to collect more taxes but lacked 
the interest to do so in previous years. How to harness and constrain 
the fiscal power of locality to benefit both the central and local coffers 
became the central concern of new institutional design in the 
upcoming fiscal reform. 
MAJOR CONTENTS OF THE 1994 FISCAL REFORM 
What is China's 1994 fiscal reform? In short, this is an umbrella 
term accommodating a wide range of files and contents. To different 
observers and commentators, the 1994 reform may have various 
connotations. The reform efforts were widely called "fiscal reform," 
"tax reform," "tax-assignment reform or "tax-sharing reform." This 
confusion may derive from a number of reform regulations enacted by 
the end of 1993 which relate to fiscal and tax systems. Accord to Jia 
(2000}, within the first one hundred days of 1994, there were about 
80 documents issued by fiscal or tax authorities as well as the State 
Council. Each added complementary regulations or adjustments to 
solve the imminent and prominent problems of tax related policy 
concerns. The chief official document, we believe, Is Decisions on 
Implementing Tax-sharing Fiscal Management System, issued by the 
State Council (1993}. The file was issued on December 15 of 1993, 
to be carried out immediately from the first day of 1994. In short, the 
1994 fiscal reform contains the following major contents. 
Tax Division 
Unlike the pre-1994 fiscal system where-the revenue amount 
was usually negotiated between the center and each province on a 
one-by-one basis, the new design unified the tax division and formed 
three parts: central tax, local tax and shared tax (see Table 2}. By 
doing so, tax obligation was expected to be transparent, with a greatly 
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reduced or eliminated transaction cost, and horizon equality realized 
among the provinces or province-level units. 
TABLE2 
Tax Shares of 1994 Tax Reform 
Central Taxes - Tariffs 
- Consumption tax and Value-added tax collected by 
customs 
- Consumption tax 
- Income tax of central enterprises 
- Income tax from financial enterprises which have 
obtained business license from the People's bank of 
China 
- Tax on revenues turned in by railways, banks and 
insurance companies · 
- Offshore oil resource taxes 
Local Taxes - Business tax (exclude that turned in by banks, railways 
and insurance companies) 
- Income tax from local enterprises 
- Personal income tax 
- Urban land use tax 
- Adjustment tax on fixed asset investment direction 
- Urban maintain and construction tax (exclude that turned 
in by banks, railways and insurance companies) 
- Real Estate duty 
- Tax on vehicle and boat license 
- Stamp duty 
- Laughter tax 
- Agricultural and husbandry tax 
- Agricultural tax levied on special products 
- Occupation tax on cultivated land 
- Contract tax 
- Inheritance and gifts tax 
- Land appreciation tax 
- Income tax on rented state land 
Shared Taxes - Value-added tax: central government (75%) and local 
government (25%) 
- Stock transactions gains tax: central government (50%) 
and local government (50%) 
- Resource tax other than offshore oil resource tax: mostly 
to local government 
Sources: The State Council (1993). 
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Ascal Administration 
Pre-1994, there was no branch of State Tax Service (STS) at sub-
national governments thus the central treasury relied on local fiscal 
departments to collect and submit revenues first, and then a portion 
was returned to the locality. As we have shown in section 2, local 
governments usually utilized this mechanism to play games with the 
center to the benefit of the locality. The 1994 fiscal reform 
established central government's own branch tax bureaus within local 
governments, creating two parallel line tax systems: a national system 
for central taxes and a local system for local taxes. Shared taxes were 
collected by the local branches of STS first, and then the proceeds 
were split between the center and sub-national governments 
according to the agreed upon formula. The downward-sharing 
mechanism is essential in preventing the previous local abuses. As 
we will see later, the sharing direction is by no means insignificant. 
Tax Rates Standardized and Tax Types Simplified 
Before 1994, the tax rates and types were very complicated. First, 
different enterprise ownerships [state, collective, private enterprises, 
township and village enterprises (TVE), foreign-invested enterprises 
(FIEs), foreign enterprises (FEs)] enjoyed different tax rates. Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) and some coastal cities had preferential tax 
policies. Many local governments also enacted a number of 
preferential tax policies to attract investment for local economic 
development. Additionally, different industries might have different 
available tax treatment. The 1994 fiscal reform unified the enterprise 
Income tax rates to be 33%, regardless of state, collective, TVE, or 
private ownerships. For joint ventures, the initial plan was that the 
unification income tax rates would be implemented for a longer term, 
when the current agreement of preferential tax policies phased out. 
However, the Asian financial crisis had postponed the implementation 
of such a plan (Lin, 2001). For tax types, the old 32 tax types (except 
tariff and agricultural taxes) would be reduced to 18 (Xu & Zhang, 
2001). One of the motivations behind the segregated tax rates was to 
curb the growth of private enterprises and to meet the government's 
special economic policies (Lin, 2001). The logic of 1994 fiscal reform 
is obvious-the tax burden among different types of enterprises should 
be equal. With the anticipated entry of WTO, the joint ventures also 
should stand on the same footing as the domestic enterprises. 
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Tax Exemptions and Deductions 
Pre-1994, local governments frequently used tax exemptions and 
deductions to attract new investment and also to conspire with 
enterprises by granting tax breaks. The net effect was the weakened 
central coffer and decreased local budgetary revenues. As explained 
in Section II, the central government is the loser in this game of 
conspiracy, while the local government is the winner with more money 
to use at its own discretion. From the perspective of the central 
government, there is an efficiency loss of taxable revenue. From the 
view of the society in general, the consequence of conspiracy 
behavior is more extra-budgetary fund and even extra-extra-budgetary 
fund collected by the local governments, leading to redundant 
industry and economic construction and increased cases of 
corruption (Holzer & Zhang, 2004). The 1994 fiscal reform provided 
tax exemption and a reduction of authority back to the central 
government, explicitly regulating that no further tax holidays or breaks 
can be granted by any local governments. But for the consistency of 
policy implementation and the credibility of local governments, the 
previously contracted tax exemptions and deductions would be 
implemented until the end of 1995. 
The aforementioned four aspects are only part of the important 
1994 fiscal reform design. The 1994 fiscal reform was not a minor 
effort in tinkering with the old fiscal system, but rather a 
comprehensive overhaul for shuffling the entirety of the institutional 
arrangement between the center and the locality associated with a 
division of tax jurisdiction and authority. The 1994 fiscal reform also 
targeted an equal tax-burden effort for different business ownership 
or types. Facing a dilemma of increasing pressure of rising demand 
for the thirsting expenditure of providing public service, while seeing a 
shrinking piece of pie in central revenue year by year, the central 
government made a grand resolution to fight back. A clear goal of 
China's 1994 fiscal reform was to make the government revenue 
cake bigger, with a larger share going to the central government (The 
State Council, 1993). The next section examines whether such 
expectations can be accomplished. 
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE 1994 FISCAL REFORM 
Almost ten years have passed since the introduction of China's 
1994 fiscal reform and it appears to be an appropriate time now to 
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assess the intermediate effect of the institutional design of the 
reforms. 
An unavoidable grand question to ask is whether the fiscal reform 
has brought about the effects the reformers expected. To be more 
specific, whether the government revenue has increased as a 
percentage of GOP {the first ratio) and whether the central 
government revenue increased over the total government revenue 
(the second ratio)? 
To answer these two specific questions, we need to examine table 
1 carefully. In the period from 1993 to 1998, the first ratio 
(government revenue over GOP) decreased in the first two years (from 
12.6% in 1993 to 10.7% in 1995) and then slightly increased in the 
next three years (from 10.7% in 1995 to 12.6 in 1998). These 
unimpressive records probably serve as the basis for many early 
unsatisfactory observers and commentators who concluded that the 
1994 fiscal reform is not a success, or at least not a big one 
{Herschler, 1995; Lin, 2000; Wang, 1997). For the second ratio, 
central government revenue over government revenue, the effect was 
immediately shown. The ratio of central government revenue over 
government revenue jumped forward from 22.0% in 1993 to 55.7% in 
1994, and then declined to 49.5% in 1998. The leap of the second 
ratio is more like a two-sided coin depending upon the interpretation, 
rather than the absolute truth. On the optimistic side, the increased 
ratio was close to the expectation number (60%) that reform 
designers had desired; on the pessimistic side, the increased share 
of the central government revenue was no more than nominal, as will 
be discussed later. 
Nevertheless, the policy designers of the1994 fiscal reform were 
not short-sighted. Their focus aimed at a long-term institutional 
rational-approach. As the Vice-Director of the State Tax Bureau noted 
in 1995, "The policy changes of the central government follow the 
principle of incremental philosophy. What concerns the central 
government is the reform of institutional mechanism, not the gain or 
loss in the short run" (Xu & Zhang, 2001). Its effect would emerge in 
a longer scope. The share of the total government revenue over GOP 
increased from 12.6% in 1993 to 18.5% in 2002. While the average 
GOP growth rate was 8.96% {excluding the influence of inflation) from 
1993 to 2001, the average growth rate of total government revenue, 
excluding the influence of inflation, was 13.2% in the same period, 
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which surpasses the GOP growth rate an average of 4.24 % each year. 
Using 1993 as the base year, the average growth rate of central 
revenue was 26.2% from 1993 to 2001, while the growth rate of 
average local revenue was 6.46%. The change from 1993 to 1994 
may have been too sudden to be indicative. Thus a better reference 
point was to use 1994 as base year. By doing so, the growth rate of 
central revenue was 14.23% from 1994 to 2001, while the local 
revenue growth rate was 16.44% in the same period.2 These numbers 
are meaningful and indicative. First, average total government 
revenue growth rate far surpassed average growth rate of GOP from 
1993 to 2001, suggesting a consistent behavior of great efforts in 
collecting tax revenues by the government. Second, using 1994 as 
the base year, we found an amazing average growth rate of both 
central government revenue (14.23%) and local government revenue 
(16.44%) from 1994 to 2001, suggesting that tax collectors at both 
central and local levels worked hard to achieve the policy goals. These 
two groups of numbers (the average GOP growth rate and the average 
growth rate of total government revenue) are reminiscent of the 
counterparts from 1978 to 1993, whenever the GOP growth rate was 
9.66% while the growth rate of total government revenue was only 
3.2%. 
Although many converging factors were at work in driving the first 
ratio (the government revenue over GOP) up from 12.6% in 1993 to 
18.5% in 2002, we have to acknowledge that the primary source of 
this success was the institutional design of the 1994 fiscal reforms. 
The high growth rates of both central government revenue and local 
government revenue from 1994 to 2001 reveal that incentives of 
both the center and the locality were consistently boosted. The 
central government's share as a percentage of total revenue from 
22.0% in 1993 Increased to 59.6% in 2001, suggesting a promising 
prospect in approaching the original policy objectives (60% for the 
second ratio). Although some may argue that the Increase of the 
central governmental revenue is only nominal, not much revenue 
would be left after deducing of the center's refund to provinces and 
fiscal transfer to poor provinces (Lee, 2000; Wang, 1997), It is at 
least politically significant even if it is nominal. Before 1994, the 
central government had to rely on local government to submit 
revenue. Now local governments must rely on central government to 
return revenue or fiscal transfer. This change from bottom-up to top-
down suggests a leader-follower game which Is beneficial In 
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strengthening the macro coordination and control capacity of the 
central government (Hu, 1996; Xu & Zhang, 2001). 
The chief accomplishment of the 1994 fiscal reforms was the 
consistent and rapid growth of government revenue. However, this 
achievement should not overshadow the reform results in other 
aspects. As an institutional overhaul of 1994 fiscal reforms, the real 
effect surpassed the expectations of some reform designers (Xu & 
Zhang, 2001). In addition to the government revenue surge, the 
performance of 1994 fiscal reform was mainly manifested in the 
adjustment of the following three pairs of relationship. They are: 
government-enterprise, central-local governments and State-citizen. 
The traditional relationship before 1994 between government and 
enterprises was more featured by administrative instruments than by 
economic means. Governments at different levels frequently 
negotiated with enterprises for the profits to be submitted. The 
contract responsibility system was a product of such a mechanism. 
But even after quota was mutually agreed, government often changed 
the rules of the game in its favor. This situation also caused the 
conspiracy of local governments with enterprise at a loss to the 
central treasury. Uncertainty, unpredictability and arbitrariness were 
the characteristics of the old system. Since 1994, the government-
enterprise relationship has been much more rule-based. Enterprises, 
irrespective of their size, types and ownership, pay taxes to the 
governments according to the corresponding tax law, rules and 
regulations. Tax burdens were unified at 33% income tax rate for 
every enterprise. Tax types were simplified from the previous 32 types 
to the current 18. Now, the norm is certainty and predictability for the 
relationship between government and enterprise. 
For the relationship between central and local governments, the 
1994 fiscal reform had greatly enhanced the transparency and 
normality of fiscal allocation. In the previous years since 1978, 
central-local fiscal relation was subjected to frequent negotiation, In 
which mechanism lacks either transparency or equity among the peer 
provinces. As evidence shows, the center had been willing and 
capable to regulate the provincial fiscal autonomy according to 
central preference (Chung, 1995). The 1994 fiscal reforms tried to 
rationalize the division of fiscal authority between center and locality, 
making the relationship more rule-based. 
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As for the relationship between the State and citizen, the focus 
was also on the rule of law. The amended Act of Personal Income Tax 
of PRC was promulgated in October 31 of 1993, to be effective on 
January 1, 1994. For wages and salary, there are nine grades of 
progressive tax rates from 5% to 45%. For individual owned business, 
the income tax follows five grades of progressive tax rates from 5% to 
35% (Jia, 2000). Some of the previous illegitimate regulations were 
abolished (Xu & Zhang, 2001). The outcome of adjusting the 
relationship between the State and citizen was not so illuminative, 
and the impact had to wait an even longer term. 
There are other accomplishments such as the containment of the 
rocketing inflation rates from late 1992 and the reduction of tax 
burden for enterprises demonstrated from empirical study (Xu & 
Zhang, 2001). The 1994 fiscal reform, as with any other reform 
crusade, was not perfect. With this point in mind, we now turn to the 
unfinished business. 
REMAINING PROBLEMS OF CHINESE FISCAL REFORMS 
The 1994 fiscal reform was a big remedial operation targeted to 
the problems of the old system. An action of such large scale cannot 
be expected to be perfect. It is nevertheless an ongoing process to 
complement the institutional design and to solve the newly emerging 
problems. "Trial and error" and "touching the stone to cross the river" 
that had guided Chinese reforms since 1978 were also in some sense 
applicable to the field of Chinese fiscal reform. Yet, pragmatic 
pressure and theoretical concerns had raised many questions that 
were not well addressed by the 1994 reform design or 
implementation. The following is only a simplified sketch of the 
problems to be dealt with by the policy makers and administrators. 
First, although the central government's share as a percentage of 
total revenue increased from 22.0% in 1993 to 59.6% in 2001, there 
were widespread concerns that the central government's disposable 
revenue was too low (Lee, 2000; Wang, 1997). Indeed, as discussed 
above, this is a "two-edged sword" depending upon how we view and 
interpret the issue. If the central revenue is defined as central 
collection plus local remittance and then minus central refunds and 
subsidies to the provinces, the percentage of central government's 
revenue was fairly low (26.0% in 1994, 30.2% in 1995, 20.9% in 
1996 and 22.0% in 1997) (Wang, 1997). According to the data from 
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Lee (2000), there was also a slight decline of net central government 
revenue over national fiscal revenue from 1992 to 1998 (Table 3). 
Second, the division of fiscal authority between the center and the 
locality should be first conducted on the analysis of expenditure need 
at each level of government. However, the 1994 fiscal reform, similar 
to previous efforts, focused on the side of revenue first, leaving the 
question of "who should be responsible for what" blurred. This 
ambiguity created the problem of ad hoc directives from the center to 
require local expenditure. These un-funded mandates frequently 
turned out to be an extra burden to the locality, a phenomenon 
popularly called "center hosted banquet but paid from local pocket." 
Third, the 1994 reforms had kept too many vestiges of the old 
system, such as the four concessions of the center to the locality. 
These vestiges served well to smooth the transition from the old 
system to the new one, but also complicated the Implementation of 
the reform design and therefore postponed the effect. 
Fourth, a rational approach of reform should clearly demarcate 
the boundary of fiscal authority between the center and the locality. 
TABLE3 
Net Central Government Revenue over National Fiscal Revenue 
(In billion RMB Yuans) 
Central Fiscal Revenue after Intergovernmental Transfers 
Year National Net Net /National 
1992 141.16 423.00 33.37% 
1993 148.81 513.22 28.99% 
1994 161.64 605.55 26.69% 
1995 194.42 711.98 27.31% 
1996 244.16 857.28 28.48% 
1997 262.48 957.46 27.41% 
1998 267.85 1,064.57 25.16% 
Notes: Net Central Fiscal Revenue • Central Fiscal Revenue - Transfers from 
center to localities + Transfers from Localities to center. To follow the 
definition of fiscal revenue in the International Monetary Fund's 
Government Finance Statistics, China's fiscal revenues are adjusted by 
including all the negative revenues such as subsidies to loss-making 
state-owned enterprises and export rebates. 
Sources: Lee (2000). 
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Unfortunately, the 1994 reforms did not prohibit the center's arbitrary 
behavior. Given the long time earned reputation of not abiding by the 
rules by the center (Chung, 1995; Herschler, 1995}, there was no 
reason for the sub-national government not to act opportunistically. 
For example, Wuhan City Tax Bureau circulated an "internal 
document" with 120 provisions that authorized tax exemptions or 
deductions for local enterprises, suggesting that some local 
governments continued to play games with the center (Herschler, 
1995}. 
Fifth, the central government claimed virtually all the tax authority 
in the 1994 fiscal reform. In addition to the tax exemption and 
deduction rights no longer available to the locality, sub-national 
governments still have no rights in deciding tax rate, determining tax 
base or levying new taxes. The formally enfeebled local government 
thus has to continue to seek the informal ways for increasing revenue, 
instruments such as collecting extra-budgetary fund and extra-extra-
budgetary fund are sometimes illegitimate, but often a possible 
choice for the local governments. 
Sixth, inter-government transfer is not rational or typical according 
to the international practice. Current government transfer in China 
includes two parts. The first is the refund to each province to ensure 
the revenue of the previous year is guaranteed. The second part is 
the fiscal transfer from the center to poor provinces (or province level 
units} to reduce the gap between rich and poor provinces. Critics 
believe that the refund enlarged rather than decreased the gap 
between rich and poor provinces, and the second part fiscal transfer 
Jacks a clear formula for deciding "who gets what." 
Seventh, since the tax-sharing system between the center and the 
provinces is far from complete, the tax-sharing system between local 
governments (government levels lower than the province level} and 
provinces leaves much to be desired (Yan, 2001; Yu, 1998; Zhang, 
2000}. 
Eighth, the fiscal reforms of 1994 did not have particular 
measures to address the Issues of extra-budgetary funds (EBFs} and 
extra-extra-budgetary funds (EEBFs} that had long plagued the central 
government. Simply stated, EBFs were income collected and 
expended by government agencies and quasi-governments (such as 
service institutions}. Although these funds are on the budgeted books, 
they are beyond the reach of fiscal departments of either central or 
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local governments. For the EEBFs which came from ad hoc charges, 
unauthorized fees, involuntary "contributions" and so forth, they are 
even not reported to fiscal departments at every level of government 
(Holzer & Zhang, 2004). 
Ninth, it is necessary to coordinate the tax behavior by the local 
branches of State Tax Bureau (STB) and local tax bureaus. Some 
enterprises face the problem of multi-head tax management since 
both the local branches of STB and local tax bureaus are collecting 
their tax, while in some other domains, "who is in charge of what" is 
not quite clear (Xu, 1998). As for the tax administrators in the local 
branches of STB, they have to be loyal to both their bosses at a higher 
level of STB offices and the local government officials. This double 
allegiance does not always work together and sometimes presents 
problems and conflicts. 
Tenth, the income tax of SOEs is collected by the separate division 
of affiliation of central and local governments respectively. The 
concept of what enterprises belong to what level of governments is a 
barrier to the establishment of a real modern enterprise system (Xu, 
1998). The different affiliations of enterprises also encourage the 
local protectionism and create a number of problems. 
Eleventh, there are wide gaps between different regions and with 
the tax policies applied to the domestic and international enterprises. 
This is not conducive to fair competition of enterprise and regions. 
When the fiscal reform system was introduced in 1994, the 
government authorized tax refunds to foreign invested enterprises 
(FIEs) and foreign enterprises (FEs) established before 1994 and 
located in special economic zones (SEZs). This preferential policy was 
initially granted for a five-year period, yet later extended to 10 years in 
some zones. Preferential tax policies expired for 10 of China's 44 
SEZs by the end of 1999 and were not renewed. The rest of the SEZs 
would phase out their preferential treatment by the end of 2003 so 
that an "even playing field" would be established ("Goodbye to SEZ," 
1998). 
Twelfth, the significance of the implementation of the rule of law 
in the area of tax collection cannot be overstated. In the period after 
the 1994's fiscal reforms, tax evasion, tax arrears and tax cheating 
were still serious. How to rigorously implement the rule of law not only 
attracted scholars (Herschler, 1995; Hu, 1996; Jla, 1999; 2000; 
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Wang, 1997), but was also emphasized by China's financial minister 
in recent years (Jin, 2004; Xiang, 2001; 2002; 2003). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING 
CHINA'S FISCAL SYSTEM 
Overall, the power of China's 1994 fiscal reforms has been 
demonstrated over time. The chief accomplishment is the increase in 
the government's total revenue over the GOP, making a growing 
bigger cake of fiscal revenue. This and other achievements are mainly 
attributable to the institutional redesign of China's central-local 
relationship, as well as State-enterprise relationship. Viewing the 
fiscal reforms of 1994 through a longer lens, this author concludes a 
far more positive assessment than most of the previous studies have 
shown. The success of the 1994 reforms does not suggest that the 
main tasks in the financial arena have been completed. Rather, the 
reform process has raised more questions than it has addressed. At 
least, twelve aspects of unsolved questions have been identified in 
the last section. To solve these questions and others that might 
appear at any moment in the transition era of reform, we have to rely 
on the rule of law and an alignment to the international standards. 
Market orientation, democratic means and rational approach could 
offer important clues for most of the reform efforts. 
Regarding the question of central revenue share, what amount is 
appropriate for the disposable revenue? We need to seek the answer 
from two sources. First, what is the international standard for the 
share of central government revenue over the total government 
revenue? Do other countries have as great of a variance of revenue 
share between central and local government according to different 
stages of economic development? And what country is a good model 
for China to follow, if there is really one? What is the appropriate 
division of expenditure between central and local government? Only 
when it is decided what functions should be the responsibility of 
central government and local government, can we approximately 
calculate what reasonable percentage of national revenue should go 
for central government's expenditure. Apparently, China Is still far 
from locating an optimal point to divide the responsibility between 
central and local governments for offering public service, and 
between State and society in deciding which part is the domain of the 
government. Certain public services urgently needed by the society 
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have not been adequately provided by the government, such as 
environment protection, while in some other areas such as profit 
making business, government still stretches a hand. Marching on the 
way toward market economy, China has a lot to learn from matured 
systems and its own previously learned lessons. 
As an authoritarian state, the 1994 reform did not constrain the 
power of central government, which endangers the efforts in 
mobilizing local enthusiasm: especially encouraging local 
governments to take advantage of any policy loopholes. With the 
frequent reversal of central policies penalizing those who did not take 
advantage of the center's moves, the lack of a constitutionally-
guaranteed framework in marking the power line between center and 
locality presents a big problem of the local's confidence in the center 
(Jia & Lin, 1994). A case in point is the issue of taxing legislative 
power by the local authority. The 1994 fiscal reforms almost do not 
touch the issue, but simply take the tax exemption and reduction 
power away from the hands of local government officials. The sub-
national governments have so far been Jacking the power to decide a 
tax base, tax rates and to levy new taxes. China is a huge country with 
a territory bigger than that of the USA and a population accounting for 
one fifth of the world population. The lack of tax legislative authority 
provides a power disadvantage to local government in meeting the 
demand of local public service. More often than not, the local 
governments have to explore other channels for revenue, such as the 
EBFs and EEBFs which are sometimes illegitimate. My 
recommendation is that China should allow provincial and city level 
government legislative power to decide a local tax base, tax rates and 
to levy new taxes, though this power should be vested in the local 
legislature-People's Congress at provincial and city levels. 
For EBFs and EEBFs, most of them should be converted to the 
budgetary fund in the management of each level of financial 
department. The government should have strict laws, rules and 
regulations to complete the transition within a given period. In doing 
so, the government revenue can be further boosted and the problems 
of EBFs and EEBFs eliminated, but a prEH:ondition is to grant local 
legislatures the power to enact local tax rules. 
Additionally, law enforcement should be strengthened. Otherwise 
these unimplemented cases become demonstrable samples for 
others to follow, further weakening the fiscal capacity of government. 
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In the past, tax evasion, tax arrears and tax cheating frequently came 
into the lexicon of fiscal management. This situation should be 
reversed to collect the revenue that the society so urgently needs. 
In 2002, total tax revenue was 1, 700.4 billion RBM yuan, in 
China,1 the biggest contributor being State-Owned Enterprise (536.17 
billion yuans, about 32.2% of the total). Other contributors to the 
revenue were: Stock-5hare Companies (435.52 billion yuans), Joint 
Venture and Foreign Enterprises (348. 71 billion yuans}, Individual 
Businesses (100.49 billion yuans), Private Enterprises (94.56 billion 
yuans) and Collective Enterprises (92.94 billion yuans}. Among these 
contributors, the share of State-Owned Enterprises had decreased 
from 55.2% in 1998 to 32.2% in 2002. The average revenue growth 
rate for the Stock-5hare Enterprises was 59.5% from 1998 to 2002 
(http:/ /chanye.finance.sina.com.cn;cs/2003-05-14/165365.shtml, 
access on April 24, 2004). These numbers indicate a changing 
structure of China's enterprises and the sources of the government 
revenue. 
In summary, 1994 fiscal reform in China was only a part of the 
reform efforts initiated since 1978. Under a broader backdrop of 
China's transition from traditional planned economy to socialist 
market economy and from rule by man to rule of law, a lot of changes 
have been occurring in virtually every corner of the Chinese society. In 
the process, administrative reforms have consistently adjusted and 
reoriented the governmental functions and the roles government 
played in the society. Enterprise reform has witnessed the 
restructuring of enterprise composition, leading to the rapid growth of 
non-state owned businesses. Political reform has brought about the 
changes that resulted in a more democratic way of organizational life. 
For the relationship between state and citizen, the current reforms 
represent a paradigm shift from the old state-centered governance 
toward new citizen-centered governance which would benefit all 
sectors of Chinese society (Zhang and Zhang, 2001). In this 
perspective, the fiscal reform is not an isolated arena. Rather, fi.scal 
reforms are driving engines for the change of the other parts of the 
society, and in the meantime, it is shaped by the Ideology of 
contemporary society. As the current catchwords indicate, the fiscal 
reforms have to "keep pace with time." 
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NOTES 
1. This perspective is obtained from an interview with local public 
finance officials from Hubei province. 
2. The growth rate of GOP or government revenues were calculated 
by the author, all growth rates deducted the influence of inflation. 
3. The number of government revenue cited here was different from 
the revenue reported by Huaicheng Xuang, the Minister of 
Finance Department 
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COMMENTS ON "ASSESSING CHINA'S 1994 FISCAL REFORMS: AN 
INTERMEDIATE REPORT" 
Melli Niu and John R. Bartle* 
As a milestone change in intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
China·s 1994 fiscal reform had far-reaching effects on China's fiscal 
administration. Assessing China's 1994 fiscal reform is therefore a 
daunting assignment. Most research deals with specific aspects of 
the reform and lacks a deep exploration of reasons for and Influences 
of the reform. This article is welcome because it fills that gap. 
The article begins by demonstrating that the 1994 fiscal reform 
was the result of converging forces beyond the superficial effort to 
improve the central government's fiscal capacity. This study argues 
that the strain of the centralized planned economic system was the 
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underlying cause. The article then examines major provisions of the 
1994 fiscal reform. The 1994 fiscal reform Is also called "tax-sharing 
reform" or "tax-assignment reform" because most provisions of the 
new system are related to the division of tax sources and tax 
administration authority between the central government and local 
governments. Four topics are discussed in turn: tax assignment; fiscal 
administration; tax rates standardization and tax simplification; and 
tax exemptions and deductions. While there is no easy way to 
evaluate the effects of the 1994 fiscal reform, this article 
demonstrates three accomplishments of the reform. First, it led to an 
increase in total government revenue as a share of the economy and 
an increase in the central government's share of total government 
revenue. Second, it improved the relationships between governments 
and enterprises, the central government and local governments, and 
the state and the citizen. Third, and most importantly, it furthered the 
movement toward a more rule-based system. However, the author 
argues that the 1994 fiscal reform left old problems and created new 
ones. Twelve problems are discussed which suggest an agenda for 
future fiscal reforms. 
The important contributions of the article are evident in three 
aspects. First, it presents a deeper understanding of the impact of 
the tax assignment reforms. Increasing the central government's 
fiscal capacity was not the most lasting change in the long run; more 
important was the move towards a rule-based fiscal administration 
system to accommodate the transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy. Second, the presentation of twelve remaining 
problems demonstrates the need for an intermediate assessment on 
the 1994 fiscal reform and provides policy-makers the direction for 
future reforms. Third, the author demonstrates that fiscal reform is 
closely related to other issues, in particular political reform that is 
shaping the evolution of democratic governance in China. 
Although the author argues that the 1994 fiscal reform leaves 
"who should be responsible for what" unsolved, it does not articulate 
an alternative approach to the issue. Perhaps this question is not one 
that should be answered directly, but rather should emerge from the 
interaction of governments, enterprises and citizens. "Who should be 
responsible for what" is the critical question that all societies have to 
answer, and most do so by iterating to a pragmatic balance of 
institutional arrangements rather than applying a textbook solution. 
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This article is important reading for scholars of fiscal 
administration and of Chinese society, as well as for Chinese policy-
makers. The timeless nature of the questions it asks also makes it of 
interest to all scholars of government administration. 
* Melli Nlu, Ph.D., and John R. Bartle, Ph.D., are an assistant professor and 
an associate professor, respectively, School of Public Administration, 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. 
